Biased Judges? Judge Characteristics and Bankruptcy Outcomes
Submitted
This version: October 2026
Abstract
Using random assignment of judges, I study the effect of judge characteristics on bankruptcy outcomes of large U.S. public firms. Firms are more likely to emerge from bankruptcy under judges who grew up during the Great Depression (Depression-baby judges) and under Democratic judges, and less likely under economics-trained judges and judges who grew up in the firm’s headquarters state. Firms whose cases are expected to be protracted spend less time in bankruptcy under Depression-baby and economics-trained judges, suggesting differences in case management across judges. I find no statistically significant relation between judge characteristics and post-emergence outcomes.
Keywords: Chapter 11, bankruptcy judges, judicial decision-making, personal experience, political ideology, economics training
JEL codes: G33, G34, K22, K41, D91
Award: Best Dissertation Award at Conference on Asia-Pacific Financial Markets (2022)
Presentations: Copenhagen Business School, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, MFA Annual Meeting, AsianFA Annual Conference, Finance Forum, FMA European Conference, Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, FMA Annual Meeting
