Bankruptcy Quarantines
Abstract
This study examines the introduction of bankruptcy quarantines that disqualifies managers engaging in negligent business practices for up to 3 years. Using administrative register data from Denmark, we document that quarantines discourage future business activity: After the quarantine, individuals are less likely to be managers or business owners. Quarantined individuals are also less likely to be involved in future bankruptcies or future criminal activities. The declining activity of quarantined managers is partially offset by spouses and children becoming more active as managers and owners, reducing the effect of quarantines at the household level. We also document changes to the managerial labor pool, resulting in fewer CEOs with multiple bankruptcies and multiple white-collar crime convictions, and an increasing tendency to appoint strawmen managers, proxied by individuals on public transfers. Overall, our findings provide the first systematic evidence on consequences of bankruptcy quarantines.
Presentations: Stockholm School of Economics (accounting), Wharton-Chicago-Harvard Insolvency & Restructuring Conference, Boca-ECGI Corporate Finance and Governance Conference, Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, CICF, GEIRC, Financial Fraud, Misconduct and Market Manipulation Conference, FMA Annual Meeting
